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Financing  Micro-­businesses  and  the  UNCITRAL  Model  Law  on  
Secured  Transactions  •  §  
  
1.   Introduction    
An  overwhelming  proportion  of  businesses  in  the  world  are  very  small,  consisting  of  just  one  
person  with   no   or   very   few   employees.         Despite   the   small   size   of   such   businesses,   it   is  
extremely  important  to  the  economic  wellbeing  of  states  that  they  thrive  and  grow.    In  order  to  
achieve  this,  access  to  finance  is  critical.    While  there  have  been  some  positive  developments  
towards   this  goal,   such  as  Government-­run  programmes   to   foster   the  creation  of  start-­ups  
(mostly  micro-­businesses)  and  to  enhance  access  to  finance  for  smaller  enterprises,  or  the  
widespread   growth   of   microfinance   in   developing   and   middle   income   countries,1   these  
measures  tend  to  be  limited  in  their  operation  and  usefulness.      Secured  financing,  especially  
when  provided  by   financial   institutions,   is  necessary   for  most  micro-­businesses   to  achieve  
their   potential,   but   access   to   this   type   of   financing   is,   at   present,   restricted   and,   in   some  
situations,  non-­existent.      The  legal  structure  for  secured  financing  provided  by  the  UNCITRAL  
Model  Law  can  alleviate  some  of   the  problems  preventing  access   to  secured   financing   for  
micro-­businesses.    This  paper  examines  these  problems,  and  the  difference  that  adoption  of  
the  Model  Law  system  could  make.    It  also  identifies  some  areas  in  which  the  Model  Law  is  
not  entirely  suitable   for   the   financing  of  micro-­businesses,  as  well  as  specific   issues  which  
must  be  addressed  by  other  areas  of  law  and  regulation  if  financing  to  micro-­businesses  is  to  
flourish.           While   the   primary   focus   is   on  micro-­businesses   in   developing   economies,   it   is  
suggested  that   the  problems  faced  by  micro-­businesses   in  accessing  finance  arise  even   in  
the   more   developed   jurisdictions,   and   that   at   least   some   of   the   solutions   suggested   are  
appropriate  for  consideration  in  all  parts  of  the  world.  
2.  Defining  the  scope  of  the  analysis  
a.   Definition  of  a  micro-­business  
Defining   the   term   ‘micro-­business’   is   a   difficult   task.  Economic  analysts,   governments   and  
supra-­national   institutions  use  different   definitions   for   the   term,  and,   often,   the   category  of  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
•	  Louise  Gullifer   (Professor   of  Commercial   Law,  Oxford  University,  Fellow  and  Tutor   in   Law,  Harris  
Manchester  College,  Oxford,  Holder  of  2017  Santander  Chair  of  Excellence  at  Universidad  Carlos  III  
de   Madrid,   during   which   time   this   paper   was   written)   and   Prof.   Ignacio   Tirado   (Faculty   of   Laws,  
Universidad  Autónoma  de  Madrid).    
This  paper  is  the  result  of  the  authors´  participation  in  UNCITRAL´s  Fourth  International  Colloquium  on  
Secured  Transactions,  held  in  Vienna  15-­17  March  2017.  We  are  indebted  to  our  co-­panelists,  Murat  
Sultanov   (World   Bank   Group)   and   María   del   Pilar   Bonilla   (Signature   Regional   Law   Group   and  
Universidad  Francisco  Marroquin,  Guatemala),  for  the  excellent  discussion  before,  during  and  after  the  
panel.  We  are  also  grateful  to  the  participants  in  the  Colloquium  for  their  insights  during  the  debate.      
§	  This  article  has  been  submitted  to  the  Uniform  Law  Review  for  publication.    
1	  See  section  3a  below.  
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micro-­businesses  is  subsumed  in  the  larger  category  of  Micro,  Small  and  Medium  Enterprises  
(MSMEs)  2.  The  typical  definition  of  a  ‘micro-­business’  is  constructed  with  figures  that  indicate  
the  size  of  a  business:  most  frequently  the  number  of  employees,  the  value  of  the  assets  or  
the  turnover  of  the  business.  The  most  commonly  used  indicator  is  the  number  of  employees.  
By  way  of  example,  in  order  for  the  World  Bank  to  consider  a  business  as  a  ‘micro-­business’,  
it   must   not   have  more   than   4   employees.      The   EU,   however,   extends   the   criterion   to   10  
employees  (and  adds  the  requirement  that  the  business  have  a  turnover  below  2  million  euro  
or  a  balance  sheet  total  of  less  than  10  million  euro)  3.  The  main  focus  of  this  paper  is  to  identify  
the   specific   characteristics   of   micro-­businesses   that   may   pose   challenges   to   the   system  
envisaged  in  the  UNCITRAL  Model  Law.  The  Model  Law´s  main  aim  is  to  increase  access  to  
finance,   especially   targeting   small   and   medium   sized   enterprises   (SMEs)   4;;   but   micro-­
businesses  present  challenges  that  are  unique,  and  that  are  not  shared  with  SMEs.  In  many  
respects,  micro-­businesses  are  closer  to  individuals  than  to  medium-­sized  businesses.  In  the  
light   of   this,   this   paper  will   adopt   the  World  Bank   definition   (a   business  with   fewer   than   4  
employees)  as  a  proxy  for  our  analysis.    
b.   The  legal  form  of  micro-­businesses  
Micro-­businesses   can   take   different   legal   forms.   Often,   especially   in   more   developed  
economies,   they   are   run   through   limited   liability   companies   and,   though   less   frequently  
nowadays,  by  means  of  partnerships  5.  The  use  of  the  corporate  form  has  many  advantages  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2  MSME  is  the  expression  commonly  used  to  designate  all  non-­large  businesses.  Effectively,   its  use  
divides   the  corporate   landscape   into   two  parts:   large  businesses  and  others.  This  division   is   indeed  
unhelpful  because  it  clusters  over  90%  of  all  businesses  into  the  same  class.      
Normally,  the  differences  between  definitions  vary  depending  on  the  reason  that  underlies  the  need  to  
define   the   term.        Sometimes   the  definition   is   ostensibly   large   to  widen   the   scope  of   certain   public  
policies  (eg,  the  EU´s  definition  of  ‘MSME’  includes  businesses  with  up  to  250  employees,  which  is  a  
truly  large  business  in  many  jurisdictions,  including  middle  income  EU  member  states);;  at  other  times,  
stakeholders   define   ‘MSME’  with   a   view   to   fostering   internal   control   and   rationalising   their   portfolio  
strategy  (eg,  banks  often  define  whether  a  business  is  in  the  category  of  ‘MSME’  depending  on  the  size  
of  the  loan  made  to  that  business).    
3   According   to   the  World   Bank´s   MSME   country   indicator   index,   the  most   used   criterion   to   define  
MSMEs  is  the  number  of  employees  (92%  of  the  definitions  include  it),  then  turnover  (49%)  and  assets  
(36%);;  and  11%  of  267  analysed  definitions  include  other  variables,  such  as  loan  size,  formality,  years  
of   experience,   etc.   (see  E.  Gonzales/M.  Hommes/M.  Mirmulstein,   “MSME  Country   Indicators   2014.  
Towards   a   Better   Understanding   of   Micro,   Small   and   Medium   Enterprises”   (available   at  
www.smefinanceforum.org/sites/all/modules/custom/sme_custom/datasites/analysis%20note.pdf).  
According   to   this   source,   the   most   common   threshold   to   define   micro-­businesses   by   number   of  
employees  is  10.      
A  helpful  overview  of  the  different  methodologies  used  to  define  micro-­businesses  can  be  found  in  O.P.  
Ardic/N.  Mylenko/V.  Saltane,  “Small  and  Medium  Enterprises.  A  Cross-­Country  Analysis  with  a  New  
Data  Set”,  Policy  Research  Working  Paper  nbr.  5538,  The  World  Bank,  Jan  2011  (the  paper  can  be  
downloaded  at  https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/3309).    
4  UNCITRAL  Legislative  Guide  to  Secured  Transactions  (2010)  Introduction,  paragraphs  2  and  6.  
5   In   jurisdictions  with  codified  civil   law  systems,   the  use  of   “commercial”  partnerships  with  unlimited  
liability  was  the  rule  at  the  time  of  codification  and  for  decades  thereafter.  Initially,  limited  liability  was  
regarded  as  a  privilege,  reserved  for  the  large  entities,  that  had  to  provide  high  amounts  of  equity  capital.  
However,  the  introduction  of  limited  liability  for  corporate  forms  with  lower  capital  requirements  (società  
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for   smaller   businesses,   but   it   has   traditionally   also   involved   high   costs   (excessive   equity  
requirements,   foundation  costs,   legal   formalities,  etc.)  and   this  has  acted  as  a  deterrent   to  
formality   in   business   practice.   Because   of   this,   many   countries   have   created   simplified  
corporate  structures,  with  more  flexibility  and  involving  fewer  costs  6.  Despite  these  attempts  
at  improving  the  vehicle,  practice  across  jurisdictions  shows  that  the  benefit  of  limited  liability  
is  severely  undermined  in  the  case  of  micro-­businesses.  Shareholders  and/or  directors  (the  
identity  of  which  in  the  case  of  micro-­entities  often  coincides)  are  very  frequently  required  to  
provide  personal  guarantees  in  order  to  obtain  financing,  which  has  the  effect  of  removing  the  
most  important  benefit  from  the  use  of  a  vehicle  with  separate  legal  personality.7  Unlike  in  the  
rest  of  the  corporate  market  landscape,  in  the  province  of  micro-­businesses  the  exercise  of  
business  activity  without  any  sort  of   legal   incorporation   is,  however,  still  widespread,  being  
particularly  prevalent  in  developing  economies  8.  Often,  individuals  operate  businesses  in  their  
own  name  and   for   their   own   interest,   as   “sole/individual   entrepreneurs”   (or   “sole/individual  
proprietors”).9.  Generally,  the  distinct  element  that  defines  a  sole  entrepreneur  is  the  fact  that  
she  conducts  a  stable  business  activity  in  the  market,  openly  in  her  own  name,  but  it   is  not  
uncommon  for  some  type  of  registration  to  be  required  10.  A  sole  entrepreneur  may  operate  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
a   responsabilità   limitata   –Italy-­,   sociedad   de   responsabilidad   limitada   –Spain-­,   GmbH   –Germany-­)  
became  an  almost  immediate  success.  The  use  of  unlimited  liability  partnerships  is  now  exceptional,  
even  for  the  MSME  sector.      The  same  is  true  for  common  law  jurisdictions.      For  example,  in  the  UK  
only  8.8%  of  total  businesses  registered  for  Value  Added  Tax  and/or  Pay  As  You  Earn  (collection  of  
income   tax  at   source  by  businesses)  are  partnerships   (which   includes   limited   liability  partnerships),  
while   68.8%   of   total   businesses   are   companies   (source,   2016   Office   of   National   Statistics,  
https://www.ons.gov.uk/businessindustryandtrade/business/activitysizeandlocation/bulletins/ukbusine
ssactivitysizeandlocation/2016)    
6  Good  examples  are   the  German  Unternehmergesellschaft,   the  Colombian  Sociedad  por  Acciones  
Simplificada,   or,   generally,   the   EU´s   single-­member   private   limited   liability   company   (see   Directive  
2009/102/EC).   Further,   the   creation   of   highly   flexible,   unregulated   companies,   with   limited   liability,  
seems  to  be  a  trend  nowadays.  This  is  the  result  of  what  has  been  labelled  as  “unincorporation”.  For  a  
summary  and  analysis,  see  J.  McCahery/E.  Vermeulen/P.  Priydershini,  “A  Primer  on  Unincorporation”,  
ECGI  Working  Paper  Series  in  Law,  Working  Paper  198/2013.  
Concerning   the   most   adequate   corporate   vehicles   to   structure   micro-­businesses,   the   work   of  
UNCITRAL´s  Working  Group   I   is   especially   relevant.   Its   documents   and   debates  may   be   found   in  
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/1MSME.html.  
7  Although  in  some  jurisdictions  there  will  also  be  tax  advantages  in  incorporating.  
8  However,  the  amount  of  “sole  entrepreneurs”  active  in  fully  developed  economies  is  surprisingly  high.  
As  an  example,  in  Germany  -­-­-­-­;;  or,  in  Spain,  -­-­-­-­-­  .    In  the  UK,  ‘sole  proprietors’  represented  18.7%  of  
businesses  registered  for  tax  purposes  in  2016  (see  above  fn  5)  
9  These  terms  are  currently  used  internationally  for  the  classic  concept  of  individual  “merchant”  present  
in  most  commercial  codes  in  civil  law  jurisdictions  and  the  concept  of  ‘sole  trader’  used  in  common  law  
jurisdictions.  
10  Registration  as  “entrepreneur”  is,  in  some  jurisdictions,  of  the  utmost  importance.  It  is  frequent  that  
registration   is   required   as   a   requirement   to   be   bound   by   certain   duties   (eg   the   filing   of   financial  
statements,  the  right  to  appoint  agents  with  general  powers  of  attorney,  etc.)  and  to  enjoy  certain  rights  
(eg,  access  to  public  funding,  to  the  services  of  chambers  of  commerce  etc.).      Registration  may  also  
be  required  for  tax  purposes.      But  the  importance  of  registration  is  even  greater   in   jurisdictions  that  
have  a  special  regulation  for  entrepreneurial  activity,  which  is  distinct  from  that  applicable  to  general  
private  parties.  This  is  the  case  in  countries  that  have  separate  commercial  and  civil  codes  (for  example,  
Spain  or  Germany).      
	   4	  
the  business  individually  or,  more  frequently,  through  one  or  more  employees  11.  The  concept  
of   a   ‘sole   entrepreneur’   also   includes   self-­employed   professionals   providing   services,  
whatever  the  type  of  activity  so  long  as  it  is  market  based.    Thus,  for  example,  a  lawyer,  an  
insurance  agent  or  a  plumber  would  all  be  micro-­businesses.  While  some  jurisdictions  might  
not  consider  these  as  sole  entrepreneurs  for  certain  legal  purposes,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  
their  situation  would  differ  from  other  types  of  sole  entrepreneur  in  terms  of  access  to  finance  
12.  In  this  paper,  we  consider  that,  with  the  exception  of  exempt  property  for  social  reasons,13  
all   the  assets  of   the  debtor  are  available   to  satisfy  all  creditors,  whatever   the   type  of  asset  
(whether  or  not  acquired  or  used  in  the  context  of  the  entrepreneur´s  professional  activity)  or  
the   origin   of   the   debt   (whether   incurred   to   finance   a   professional   activity   or   simply   as   a  
consumer  debt).  Even  in  jurisdictions  where  there  is  regulatory  division  between  “formal”  (often  
registered)   entrepreneurs   and   other   individuals   informally   operating   businesses,   the  
separation  of  assets  does  not  exist,  and,  where  it  does,  it  is  only  relevant  to  the  order  in  which  
creditors  can  look  to  assets  to  satisfy  the  outstanding  debt,  so  that  creditors  whose  debts  have  
arisen   in   the   context   of   the  entrepreneurial   activity  must   first   exhaust   assets  used   in   such  
activity).    
c.   The  importance  of  micro-­businesses  
The   importance   of   micro-­businesses   cannot   be   overstated.   In   quantitative   terms,   these  
businesses  represent  the  vast  majority  of  the  total  number  of  businesses  in  every  nation  on  
the  planet.  The  relative  importance  of  their  economic  output  is  particularly  high  in  developing  
and  middle  income  countries,  where  official  figures  only  show  a  fraction  of  the  total  number  of  
micro-­businesses  due  to  the  high  level  of  informality  14.    
  
Chart  1.  Source:  IFC  Enterprise  Finance  Gap  Database  15  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11  Somewhat  surprisingly,  some  surveys  exclude  entrepreneurs  with  no  employees  from  the  category  
of  micro-­business  or   treat   them  as  “informal”  enterprises  (see,   for  example  the  World  Bank  Group´s  
Enterprise   Finance   Gap   Methodology,   available   at   https://www.smefinanceforum.org/data-­sites/ifc-­
enterprise-­finance-­gap).  In  this  paper,  all  sole  entrepreneurs  are  treated  as  micro-­businesses.    
12  In  the  European  commercial  codes  of  the  nineteenth  century,  professionals  were  often  left  out  of  the  
special  regulation  regime  envisaged  for  “entrepreneurs”  (rectius,  “merchants”).  With  time,  this  approach  
has  been  abandoned  in  most  jurisdictions.    
13  See  further  4b  below.  
14   The   IFC   (World   Bank   Group)   reported   that,   by   October   2013,   about   80%   of   all   businesses   in  
developing  nations  were  either  informal  or  had  no  employees  (a  total  estimate  of  300  million  enterprises)  
(see   https://www.smefinanceforum.org/data-­sites/ifc-­enterprise-­finance-­gap#field-­data-­sites-­tabs-­tab-­
4).  Although  the  data  is  only  approximate,  in  2007,  India  counted  about  1.6  million  formal  MSMEs,  while  
more   than  26  million  were  unregistered.  For  an   interesting  overview  of   the  data  on  MSMEs,  see  K.  
Kushnir/M.  Mirmulstein/R.  Ramalho,   “Micro,  Small  and  Medium  Enterprises  Around   the  World:  How  
Many   Are   There,   and   What   Affects   the   Count”,   The   World   Bank/IFC,   available   at  
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/9ae1dd80495860d6a482b519583b6d16/MSME-­CI-­
AnalysisNote.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.      
15  The  chart   is  an  adapted  version  of  a  chart   included   in   the  presentation  of  Murat  Sultanov,  of   the    
World  Bank  Group,  in  UNCITRAL´s  Secured  Transactions  Colloquium,  March  2017  (‘MS  presentation’).  
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But  the  quantitative  and  qualitative  importance  of  micro-­businesses  is  global,  and  is  
not   limited   to   less   developed   economies.   In   the   following   chart   we   show   the  
percentage   of   micro-­businesses   out   of   the   total   number   of   businesses   in   several  
representative  jurisdictions  as  well  as  their  share  of  the  total  work  force.  A  strikingly  
similar  picture  is  shown  in  these  selected  jurisdictions  from  different  continents:  around  
90%   of   all   businesses   and   almost   half   of   the   labour   force   are   linked   with   micro-­
businesses  16.  
  
Chart  2.  Source:  SME  Finance/IFC17  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The   presentation   is   available   at  
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/colloquia/4thSecTrans/Presentations/3Fin2Micr/Microfinance_SUL
TANOV.pdf.    
16  Businesses  with  fewer  than  10  employees  constitute  over  93%  of  the  total  amount  of  businesses  in  
the   European   Union   (see   http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-­
explained/index.php/Structural_business_statistics_overview).  
According   to   the  World  Bank  Group,   the  percentage  of   the   full   time   labour   force   involved   in  micro-­
businesses   in   developing   nations   is   around   two   thirds   of   the   total   work   force.   See  
https://www.smefinanceforum.org/data-­sites/ifc-­enterprise-­finance-­gap#field-­data-­sites-­tabs-­tab-­4.      
17  The  data  for  each  country  can  be  accessed  at  smefinanceforum.org  ,  a  website  of  the  World  Bank  
Group.  The  definition  of  micro-­business  used  is  not  fully  consistent  in  all  the  countries  included  in  the  
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On  the  basis  of  these  numbers,  it  is  apparent  that  granting  sufficient  and  affordable  
access  to  finance  micro-­businesses  is  paramount  for  any  economy  to  thrive.  With  very  
few  exceptions,  no  business  starts  as  a  large  organisation.  Micro-­businesses  are  thus  
the   entry   point   for   entrepreneurialism   and   are   the   channel   to   innovation.   The  
development   and   growth   of   smaller   enterprises,   however,   also   concerns   social  
development  and  justice.  Start-­ups  provide  access  to  the  market  for  the  young  and  
second  chances  to  more  experienced  entrepreneurs.  Micro-­businesses  often  require  
small  amounts  of  capital  and  hence  are  the  vehicles  used  by  the  members  of  society  
with  few  resources.  Their  development  is  also  the  key  to  addressing  certain  failures  of  
the  economic  system:  those  who  have  more  difficult  access  to  the  labour  market  (for  
example,  women  or  minorities)  or  those  who  have  lost  their  jobs  can  find  alternative  
opportunities  in  the  micro-­business  sector.    
d.   The  finance  gap  for  micro-­businesses  
MSMEs   in   general   have   severe   problems   accessing   adequate   levels   of   financial  
support.   Although   the   problem   affects   countries  with   developed  markets   and,   to   a  
greater   extent,   middle   income   jurisdictions,   it   is   particularly   critical   in   developing  
economies.  According  to  data  gathered  by  the  World  Bank  Group,  the  finance  gap  for  
MSMEs   (by   October   2013)   was   approximately   2   trillion   USD,   while,   by   way   of  
comparison,  the  amount  of  all  outstanding  credit  granted  to  MSMEs  was  6  trillion  USD  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
chart.  All  EU  and  Latin  American  countries  define  microbusiness,  inter  alia,  as  having  fewer  than  10  
employees;;   however,   Bangladesh   limits   the   concept   to   businesses   with   9   employees   or   less,   the  
Popular  Republic  of  Lao  to  5  or  less,  and  Rwanda  to  3  or  less.      
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18.   The   finance   gap   is   even   larger   in   relation   to   the   specific   categories   of   micro-­
businesses  (defined  as  having  up  to  4  employees)  and  to  informal  enterprises.  Over  
200  million  formal  and  informal  micro-­businesses  were  ‘unserved’  (that  is,  they  needed  
credit  but  had  no  access  to  credit)  or  ‘underserved’  (that  is,  they  had  a  loan  and/or  a  
line  of  credit  but  were  constrained  as  to  the  amount  of  available  financing)19.  In  the  
following  chart  we  provide  some  more  detail  of  the  finance  gap,  as  well  as  information  
about  the  type  of  financing  and  financial  services  which  are  available.      
  
Chart  3.  Financial  Gap  and  Types  of  Financing  for  Informal  Businesses  20    
(informal  +  no  employees)  
  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18  As  of  March  2017,   the  amount  of  unserved/underserved  MSMEs   in  developing  economies  would  
range  between  2.1  and  2.5  trillion  USD,  according  to  MS  presentation,  see  fn  15.    
19   See   https://www.smefinanceforum.org/data-­sites/ifc-­enterprise-­finance-­gap.   The   ‘finance   gap’   in  
these   charts   is   the   percentage   of   all   businesses   of   the   specified   category   that   have   no   access   or  
insufficient  access  to  credit  (as  opposed  to  businesses  that  do  not  need  more  credit  or  that  do  not  need  
any   credit   at   all).   The  numbers   reflect   the   answers   to   a   survey,   and  are   not   the   result   of   technical  
calculations  on  the  balance  sheet  or  business  plans  of  the  businesses.    
20  ECA  stands  for  “Europe  and  Middle  East”;;  LAC  for  “Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean”;;  MENA  for  
“Middle  East  North  Africa”;;  and  “Africa”  includes  sub-­Saharian  Africa.    
Data  concerning  informal  enterprises  is  not  always  updated  to  October  2013  and  it  is  gathered  through  
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The  data  displayed  above  shows  the  enormous  finance  gap  for  micro-­businesses  as  
a   global   problem,   affecting   all   regions   included   in   the   chart.   The   percentage   of  
microbusinesses  with  no  access  to  finance  or  with  insufficient  access  to  funding  is  in  
around  or  over  50%.  The  participation  of  banks  in  the  financing  of  micro-­businesses  
is   also   low,   considerably   lower   than   their   provision   of   financial   support   to   larger  
businesses  21.  Frequently,  micro-­businesses  are  constrained  to  operate  on  the  basis  
of  equity   finance  together  with  commercial  (or   trade)  credit.22  The  availability  of   the  
former   is,   for   micro-­businesses,   usually   very   limited;;   the   latter   is   volatile   and   its  
maturity   is   short.  Because  of   this  situation,  other  extraordinary   financing   resources  
need  to  be  put  in  place.  A  classic  example  is  the  establishment  by  Governments  of  
lines  of  credit,  guarantee  schemes  and  other  public  mechanisms  to  support  access  to  
finance   for  micro-­businesses.         Similarly,   and   often   in   addition   to   the  Government  
schemes,   associations   of   micro-­businesses   and   chambers   of   commerce   create  
mutual   guarantee   schemes   to   assist   start-­ups   and   small   entrepreneurs.   Although  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21  Microbusinesses  have  a  low  demand  for  flexible,  tailor-­made  loans,  and  their  use  of  banking  services  
other  than  loans  is  limited.  This  may,  in  part,  help  explain  the  relatively  unimportant  played  by  banks  in  
the   MSME   sector.   See   J.   Glisovic/M.   Martinez,   “Financing   Small   Enterprises:   What   Role   for  
Microfinance  Institutions?”,  CGAP  Focus  Note  nbr.  81,  July  2012,  pg.1  et  seq.    
22  See  further  section  3c.  below  
42
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these   measures   are   to   be   commended,   they   frequently   constitute   no   more   than  
temporary  and  insufficient  relief  for  enterprises  that  are  unable  to  obtain  credit  in  the  
market   through   their   own   means   (and   hence,   to   some   extent,   interfere   with   an  
adequate  market  selection  process).    
Some  of  the  main  reasons  why  micro-­businesses  strive  to  access  sufficient  financial  
support  are  the  following:      
i.   Most  micro-­businesses  do  not  have  real  estate  to  use  as  collateral.23  The  lack  
of  real  estate  is  a  particular  problem  in  jurisdictions  with  banking  sectors  that  
are  either  underdeveloped  or  where  competition  is  limited.  This  is  the  situation  
in   many   developing   and   middle   income   countries,   where   banks   are   simply  
unwilling  to  lend  to  micro-­businesses  (or  anyone  else,  for  that  matter)  unless  
real  estate  is  provided  as  collateral  to  secure  the  transaction.    
ii.   The   amount   and   value   of   movable   assets   in   the   possession   of   micro-­
businesses  is  limited,  its  maintenance  is  difficult  to  monitor  and  its  enforcement  
is  complex  and  costly  compared  to  the  value  of  the  assets.24  Because  of  this,  
creditors   in   jurisdictions   without   a   well-­functioning,   cost-­effective   system   of  
secured  transactions  are  often  unwilling  to  lend  against  this  sort  of  collateral.      
iii.   Severe   information  problems  exist   in   the   financing  of  micro-­businesses.  The  
level  of  formality  in  such  businesses  is  often  low  and  the  information  provided  
to  financiers  is  unreliable.  The  more  underdeveloped  the  economy,  the  graver  
the  problem.  In  jurisdictions  with  a  functioning  tax  system  in  place,  some  micro-­
businesses  must,  at   least,  compile  and  submit   templates  with  basic   financial  
information  at  the  end  of  each  fiscal  year;;  but,  not  infrequently,  smaller  micro-­
businesses,  with  turnovers  below  a  certain  threshold,  are  exempt  from  these  
reporting  duties.  Particularly   in   the   case  of   unincorporated  microenterprises,  
financial  accounts  are  not  properly  filed  and  reported.  Often  micro-­businesses  
have  a  short   life   cycle   25  and   the   low   level  of  bank  debt   causes   them   to  be  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23  See  further  section  3c.  below.  
24  See  section  3c.  below  
25   The   survival   of   businesses   is   directly   related   to   its   size,   in   part   precisely   because   the   larger  
enterprises  have  more  and  cheaper  access  to  financial  capital  (see  the  classic  analysis  of  D.  Audretsch,  
“New  Firm  Survival  and  the  Technological  Regime”,  The  Review  of  Economics  and  Statistics,  1991,  
nbr.  73,  p.  441  et  seq.   In   the  United  States,   for  example,  only  about  50%  of  new  small  businesses  
survive  beyond   the  4th   year,  and  around  40%  beyond   the  5th:   see,  with  similar  data  and   results,  B.  
Headd,  “Redefining  Business  Success:  Distinguishing  between  Closure  and  Failure”,  in  Small  Business  
Economics,  2003,  nbr.  21,  p.  51  et  seq;;  and  H.  Carder/J.  Leatherman,  “Small  business  Survival  and  
Sample  Selection  Bias”,  in  Small  Business  Economics,  2011,  nbr.  37,  p.  155  et  seq.  Numbers  do  not  
seem  to  be  too  different  in  certain  developing  jurisdictions.  In  Colombia,  a  recent  analysis  shows  that  
more  than  50%  of  micro-­businesses  survive  after  the  5th  year:  see  L.  Santana,  “Determinants  for  Micro-­
Enterprises  Survival  in  Bogata:  An  Analysis  using  Duration  Models”,  in  Innovar,  2017,  vol.  27,  nbr.  64,  
available   in   http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0121-­50512017000200005  
(document  in  Spanish).  The  duration  of  microbusinesses  in  developing  and  middle  income  economies  
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invisible  to  credit  reporting  systems.  All  of  this  hinders  access  to  banking  and  
commercial  credit,  and  increases  transaction  costs.    
iv.   On  the  supply  side,  a  number  of  factors  have  the  effect  that  banks  fail  to  carry  
out  proper   viability  or   risk  assessments,   and   that   they  will   only   lend  against  
collateral   (which,   as   stated   earlier,   is   scarce).         These   factors   include   the  
unreliability  of   information  mentioned  above  and   the  existence  of  poor  credit  
recovery   and   enforcement   systems.         Further,   since   only   small   amounts   of  
finance  are  involved,  banks  will  only  make  such  loans  if  the  transaction  costs  
are  commensurately  low.  
v.   There   is   very   considerable   asymmetry   in   bargaining   power   between  
professional   lenders   and   micro-­businesses.      All   too   often,   this   allows   such  
lenders  to  charge  excessive  interest  rates  (which  has  the  effect  of  shortening  
the  chances  of  survival  of  micro-­businesses)  and  to  request  collateral  with  a  
much  higher  value  than  the  amount  of  financing  provided.26    
  
The  maturity  of  the  credit  received  by  micro-­businesses  is  often  short.  Minimizing  the  
time  for  repayment  reduces  monitoring  costs   for  banks  and  financial   lenders27;;  and  
trade  creditors,  such  as  suppliers  and  service  providers,  extend  short  term  credit  either  
because   they   themselves   borrow   short   term   or   because,   in   the   case   of   larger  
distributors,   the   imbalance   of   bargaining   power   allows   them   to   impose   conditions  
beneficial   to   them.      Due   to   the   small   size   of   the   business   and   the   relatively   low  
revenues,  the  working  capital  of  micro-­businesses  enterprises  tends  to  be  very  small.  
This  results  in  micro-­businesses  living  permanently  on  the  verge  of  financial  distress,  
with   all   the   negative   consequences   that   such   a   situation   normally   entails   28.   The  
reduced  liquidity  buffer,  the  lack  (or  unreliability)  of  financial  information  and  the  small  
amounts   involved   reduce   the   incentive   of   creditors   to  monitor   the   activity   and   the  
financial   status   of   the   microbusiness.   The   problem   is   not   always   just   a   matter   of  
incentives.   Entities   financing   micro-­businesses   in   developing   countries   often   lack  
tailored  risk  assessment  mechanisms,  are  deficient   in  debt  management  strategies  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
is  rather  difficult  to  quantify.  The  reason  is  that  most  of  these  jurisdictions  do  not  have  a  widely-­used  
insolvency  system  and  suffer  from  a  low  level  of  formality,  and  hence  many  –probably  most-­  of  micro-­
businesses  never  formally  end  (they  simply  de  facto  cease  to  trade  and  disappear).    
26  See  section  5  
27  Banks  react  to  the  lack  of  reliable  information  by  reducing  the  maturity  of  the  loans.  See  the  classic  
analysis  by  R.  Rajan,    “Insiders  and  outsiders:  the  choice  between  informed  and  arm’s-­length  debt”,  
Journal  of  Finance  1992,  nbr.  47,  pgs.  1367-­1400;;  and  D.  Diamond,  “Debt  maturity  and  liquidity  risk”,  
Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics,  1991,  nbr.  106,  pgs.  709-­737.    
28  Enterprises  under  constant  threat  of  defaulting  upon  payments  due  in  the  ordinary  course  of  business  
find  themselves  in  a  weak  bargaining  position,  have  difficulties  to  plan  beyond  the  short  term,  lose  the  
ability  to  attract  investments  in  order  to  grow  and  often  have  to  dispose  of  assets  in  a  fire  sale,  which  
undermines  the  value  of  the  business  and  jeopardises  its  chances  of  future  recovery.    
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and   often   even   lack   specialised   employees   to   handle   the   loan   portfolio.   On   the  
demand  side,  since  micro-­businesses  have  a  strong  personal  and  family  component,  
entrepreneurs  often  postpone  adopting  any  action  that  will  weaken  their  control  of  the  
activity.  Because  of  this,  microbusinesses  normally  do  not  use  timely,  value-­preserving  
restructuring  options,  and,   instead,  end  up   in  piece-­meal   liquidations   that  generate  
very  low  returns  to  creditors.  The  problem  of  micro-­businesses  is,  thus,  not  only  one  
of  access  to  credit,  but  one  that  affects  the  entire  lifecycle  of  credit.      
3.  Financing  models  for  micro-­businesses              
a.  Introduction:  the  two  models  used  in  the  financing  micro-­businesses    
There  is  a  place  where  general  financial  institutions  do  not  reach.  Paradoxically,  this  
loophole  lies  not  where  banks  and  other  financial  entities  are  asked  for  too  much,  but  
where  the  smallest  borrowers  apply  for  too  little.  Since  these  borrowers  have  no  other  
“valuable   collateral”   to   provide   other   than   their   own   repayment   capacity,   and,  
additionally,   because   of   the   high   levels   of   informality   and   very   low   levels   of  
sophistication,  the  machinery  of  ordinary  financial  institutions  becomes  too  costly  and  
cumbersome  for  financing  to  be  economic:  the  overhead  costs,  including  the  cost  of  
the  risk  assessment  process,  are  too  great  for  lending  to  be  a  worthwhile  activity.  As  
early  as  the  early  18th  century,  special  financing  vehicles  were  created  to  fill  the  gap.  
These   vehicles,   which   initially   were   just   funds   created   by   charitable   donations,  
mushroomed  in  the  20th  century,  becoming  professional,  for-­profit  financial  institutions  
providing  ‘microfinance’  29.  Microfinance  institutions  thrive  where  there  is  the  greatest  
need,  that  is,  where  there  are  very  undeveloped  banking  systems  together  with  large  
sections  of  the  population  with  very  low  income.  It  is,  thus,  mainly  a  practice  found  in  
developing  nations.  The  banking  techniques  used  in  microfinance  lending  are  based  
on  intense  proximity  between  lender  and  borrower.  Collateral  is  hardly  ever  required,  
and  loans  are  granted  following  an  assessment  of  the  repayment  capacity  or  other,  
more  “social”,  variables  (such  as  reputation  and  family  involvement).  The  loans  are  for  
very  small  amounts  and  must  be  repaid  within  a  short  period,  although  typically  the  
microfinance   institution   seeks   a   long-­term   relationship   with   its   clients.   Allegedly  
because  of  the  high  costs  involved  in  the  lending  process,  interest  rates  charged  by  
for-­profit,  private  microfinance  entities  tend  to  be  very  high  (and  indeed  are  higher  than  
the   interest   rates  of   the  general  banking  sector).   Interestingly,  often   the  number  of  
non-­performing  loans  in  the  microfinance  financial  sector  are  lower  than  those  in  the  
rest  of  the  financial  market.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  A  very  interesting  historic  review  of  the  sector  can  be  read  in  A.  Hollis/A.  Sweetman,  “The  Evolution  
of  a  Microcredit  Institution:  The  Irish  Loan  Funds,  1720-­1920”,  The  Department  of  Economics  of  the  
University  of  Toronto  Working  Paper  nbr.  UT-­ECIPA-­ECPAP-­96-­01,  January  1996,  passim.    
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However,  microfinance   institutions  have  also  been  subject   to   criticism   30.  The  high  
interest   rates  charged  and   the   limited  scope  of  microfinance,  both   functionally  and  
geographically,   make   it   insufficient   to   cover   fully   the   finance   gap   which   exists   in  
relation   to   micro-­businesses,   as   discussed   above.31   Nowadays,   technological   and  
institutional   improvements,  as  well  as  new  forms  of  secured  credit,  have  paved  the  
way  for  a  much-­needed  increase  in  the  ability  of  micro-­businesses  to  obtain  finance  
from  the  general  financial  sector.  We  shall  devote  the  following  sections  to  the  analysis  
of  these  mechanisms  which  have  the  potential  to  bridge  the  finance  gap.    
b.   Collateral  available  for  micro-­businesses        
This  section  examines  the  type  of  collateral  that  is  available  for  micro-­businesses  to  
provide  to  lenders  and  to  other  providers  of  finance.        Obviously,  this  is  highly  context-­
specific.  One  variable,  for  example,  is  the  type  of  finance  which  is  being  sought.  For  
example,  micro-­businesses  may  seek   to   finance   the  acquisition  of  a   specific  asset  
(usually   equipment),   the   acquisition   of   inventory   or   cash   flow.      Different   types   of  
collateral  are  appropriate  for  different  types  of  finance.    In  the  context  of  acquisition  
finance,32  where  the  finance  is  to  enable  the  business  to  acquire  a  piece  of  equipment,  
the  equipment  itself  will  usually  serve  as  collateral  under  a  leasing,  hire  purchase  or  
conditional  sale  agreement.      Similarly,  where  the  business  is  acquiring  raw  materials  
or  stock  in  trade,  these  may  be  financed  by  the  sale  being  on  credit  terms,  namely,  
trade  credit.        In  some  jurisdictions,  the  seller  will  often  be  protected  by  a  retention  of  
title  clause  or  equivalent  (so  that  the  items  being  acquired  act  as  collateral),  while  in  
other   jurisdictions   it   is   more   common   that   the   transaction   will   be   unsecured   and  
structured  using  post-­dated  cheques,  bills  of  exchange  or  promissory  notes.        In  this  
section  what  is  primarily  examined  is  the  availability  of  collateral  for  a  bank  making  a  
loan  to  the  business,  which  could  either  be  a  revolving  facility  such  as  an  overdraft  or  
a  term  loan.  
For  most  lenders,  the  best  collateral  is  real  estate.      However,  a  micro-­business  is  very  
unlikely  to  have  real  estate  available  to  be  given  as  collateral.33        This  may  be  because  
the  sole  entrepreneur  or  guarantor  is  not  willing  to  mortgage  their  home,  or,  which  is  
more   likely,  because   it   is  already  mortgaged   in   favour  of   the  bank   that   financed   its  
acquisition.  Moreover,  many  individuals  will  not  own  real  estate  at  all.    If  real  estate  is  
available,  it  is  likely  to  be  of  much  greater  value  than  the  amount  of  the  loan,  so  that  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30   E.g.,   see  M.   Duvendak/R.   Palmer-­Jones/J.   Copestake/L.   Hooper/Y.   Looke/N.   Rao,   “What   is   the  
evidence  of  the  impact  of  microfinance  on  the  well-­being  of  poor  people?”,  EPPI  Centre,  Social  Science  
Research   Unit,   University   of   London,   Aug.   2011,   available   at  
https://www.givedirectly.org/pdf/DFID_microfinance_evidence_review.pdf.    
  
31  See  section  2d.  
32  Also  called  asset  finance  
33  See  also  section  2c(i)  above.  
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the   loan   would   be   heavily   overcollateralised34   and   the   transaction   costs   would  
outweigh   the   benefit   of   the   loan.35   Thus,   any   available   collateral   will   have   to   be  
moveable  property.  
Ideally,  moveable  property  offered  as  collateral  for  a  loan  to  a  micro-­business  would  
meet  all,  or  most,  of  the  following  conditions.      First,  it  should  be  easily  valued,  so  that  
the  lender  can  assess  that  it  covers  the  amount  at  risk  with  a  suitable  haircut,  and  the  
borrower  can  make  sure  that  it  is  not  too  heavily  overcollateralised.        Secondly,  the  
initial  processing  of  the  transaction  should  be  low  cost  and  speedy.      Thirdly,  it  should  
not  be  too  easy  for  the  borrower  to  dispose  of  the  collateral  without  the  consent  of  the  
lender  (although  some  ability  to  dispose  may  be  necessary,  depending  on  the  type  of  
collateral).      Fourthly,  it  should  be  easy,  quick  and  cheap  to  enforce  against  it  if  there  
is  default.    Thus,  liquid  collateral  is  best  as  the  value  is  easily  realised,  but  it  should  
also   be   possible   to   take   possession   or   control   speedily   so   that   the   value   can   be  
realised.      
Of  course,  legal  rules  and  infrastructure  creating  available  markets  have  a  part  to  play  
in   this   as   well   as   the   nature   of   the   collateral   itself.      The   system   provided   by   the  
UNCITRAL   Model   Law   incorporates   many   features   which   enable   some   of   these  
conditions  to  be  met.        Thus,  for  example,  a  cheap,  quick,  effective  registration  system  
for  security  rights,  such  as  that  provided  for  under  the  Model  Law,  enables  the  initial  
transaction  costs  to  be  kept  low,  and  also  enables  lenders  to  ensure  they  have  priority  
over   other   claims   to   the   collateral,   since   they   can   search   for   previously   registered  
interests,  and  enables  a  lender  to  protect  itself  by  registration.        Moreover,  the  Model  
Law  enables  lenders  to  take  security  over  all  types  of  assets,  including  future  assets.      
The   category   of   ‘future   assets’   includes   assets   which   the   business   will   purchase,  
produce,   grow   or   otherwise   acquire   in   the   future,   and   therefore   includes   not   only  
equipment  but  also  inventory,  receivables  and  cash,  over  which  it  is  not  easy,  or  even  
possible,  to  take  security  under  many  existing  legal  systems.          Thus  the  Model  Law  
system  increases  the  types  of  available  collateral  which  can  be  used.      Moreover,  it  
provides   an   effective   and   cheap   system   of   enforcement,   including   out   of   court  
enforcement.36  
In  reality,  though,  the  main  limit  on  collateral  which  can  be  offered  by  a  micro-­business  
is   practical   availability.      This  will   vary   enormously   depending   on   the   nature   of   the  
business,  but  certain  categories  can  be  enumerated  and  some  examples  given.      First,  
the  business  may  have  tangible  assets  used  as  equipment  (in  a  broad  sense).      These  
can  be  acquired  either  by  leasing  or  by  other  forms  of  functional  secured  lending,  such  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34  MS  presentation  (fn  15),  based  on  ‘A  study  of  collateral  options  for  microfinance  loans  in  Pakistan,’  
(PMN,  2012)    
35  C.  Miller,  ‘Agricultural  Finance’  in  the  New  Microfinance  Handbook,  WBG,  2013  at  page  233.  
36   See   Model   Law,   chapter   VII.      Some   types   of   out-­of-­court   enforcement,   such   as   the   taking   of  
possession  of  goods,   requires   the  written  consent  of   the  grantor,  which  will   typically  be  given   in   the  
security  agreement,  see  Article  77(2)  and  Guide  to  Enactment  para  424.  [note:  needs  to  be  checked  
when  final  version  GtE  is  published]  
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as  hire-­purchase  agreements  (acquisition  finance).37      This,  of  course,  means  that  they  
are   not   available   as   collateral   to   be   used   for   other   types   of   financing.      Under   the  
UNCITRAL  Model  Law,  however,  acquisition  finance  is  treated  as  secured  lending,  so  
to  the  extent  that  the  value  of  equipment  exceeds  the  amount  due,  that  surplus  value  
can  be  used  as  collateral  for  new  finance.        Secondly,  the  business  may  own  inventory  
which  has  not  been  acquired  on  credit  on  retention  of  title  terms38,  either  because  such  
terms  are  not  used  by  suppliers  or  because  they  are  not  purchased  but  acquired  in  
other   ways,   for   example,   agricultural   products   which   are   grown   or   bred39      Such  
inventory  can  be  given  as  collateral.        Thirdly,  the  business  may  have  receivables  if  it  
sells  goods  or  provides  services  on  credit,  which  could  be  the  subject  of  receivables  
financing   (that   is,   a   sale   of   receivables   to   a   discounter   or   factor)   or   of   a   security  
interest.40      
However,  both  inventory  and  receivables  may  not  meet  the  criteria  set  out  above  for  
suitable  collateral  if,  as  is  often  the  case,  the  micro-­business  does  not  have  sufficient  
accounting  records  to  prove  the  existence  of  these  assets.    As  mentioned  above,  many  
micro-­businesses   are   not   required   to   keep   accounting   records   by   the   state,   while  
larger  businesses  would  have  to  do  so  for  tax  purposes  and  because  accounts  are  
required  for  registered  corporations.41          Without  the  incentive  of  mandatory  record  
keeping,  and  because  of   the  cost,  micro-­businesses  are  unlikely   to  have  even   the  
limited  infrastructure  required  to  record  purchases  and  sale  to  the  level  of  accuracy  
required  by  financial  institutions.                  
Fourthly,  the  individual  or  individuals  who  run  the  business  may  have  savings  which  
they  do  not  (or  cannot)  disrupt  to  spend  on  the  business  but  which  are  available  as  
collateral  for  a  loan.      This  could  be  cash  in  a  deposit  account,  which  may  be  required  
to  be  saved  by  the   lender,42  or   it  could  be  a  tangible  asset,  such  as  gold   jewellery,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37   For   example,   Tugende,   an   asset   finance   company,   funds   the   acquisition   of  motor   cycle   taxis   in  
Kampala  by  the  use  of  hire  purchase  agreements  (MS  presentation  slide  17  (see  fn  15))  and  bee  hives  
(including  the  bees)  are  acquired  under  a  similar  scheme  (based  on  an  annual  leasing  contract  with  an  
option  to  purchase)  in  Kenya  funded  by  KDA  (MS  presentation  slide  19  (see  fn  15)  
38  Inventory  obtained  on  retention  of  title  terms  is  not  available  as  collateral  for  other  financing.    Under  
the  Model  Law  a  junior  ranking  security  interest  can  be  given  over  such  assets,  but  there  is  unlikely  to  
be  enough  surplus  value  in  the  assets  to  make  this  worthwhile.  
39  An  example  of  the  former  are  crops  which  are  often  given  as  collateral  by  granting  a  security  interest  
over   a  warehouse   receipt   produced   by   the  warehouse   in  which   harvested   crops   are   stored.            An  
example  of  the  latter  is  the  use  of  present  and  future  turtles  bred  in  turtle  farms  in  China  as  collateral  
given  to  credit  providers  such  as  Jingshan  Country  Rural  Credit  Cooperative  (MS  presentation  slide  20  
(see  fn  15)).  
40  This  form  of  financing  can  also  take  place  higher  in  the  supply  chain,  thus  enabling  raw  materials  to  
be  supplied  on  credit  to  the  micro-­business,  see,  for  example,  in  the  context  of  the  agricultural  value  
chain,  C.  Miller,  ‘Agricultural  Finance’  in  the  New  Microfinance  Handbook,  WBG,  2013  at  page  240.  
41  Section  2c.  
42  J.  Ledgerwood  and  J.  Earne,  ‘Credit’,  at  page  217  and  I.  Mas,  ‘Beyond  Products:  Using  Infrastructure  
Customer  Experiences  on  Mobile  Phones’  at  page  314  in  the  New  Microfinance  Handbook,  WBG,  2013.  
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which  is  a  very  common  form  of  saving  in  some  parts  of  Pakistan  and  India  and  which  
can  be  provided  as  collateral  by  way  of  possessory  pledge.43  
c.  Guarantees  (given  by  related  parties)  
Experience   across   all   types   of   jurisdictions   shows   that   microbusinesses   are   very  
frequently   requested   to  provide  personal  guarantees   to  obtain  credit.  Shareholders  
and/or  directors,  who  are  often   the  same  person,  guarantee   the  debts  of   the   legal  
entity,   and   family   members   and   other   related   parties   do   the   same   with   regard   to  
individual  entrepreneurs.  Lenders  (mainly  financial  lenders)  often  require  guarantees  
in  addition   to   the  provision  of  collateral.  No  system  of  access   to   finance   for  micro-­
businesses  would  be  complete  unless   the   regime  of   secured   transactions   is  made  
consistent  with  the  regulation  of  personal  guarantees.  
Guarantees  enhance  the  assets  available  for  repayment  and  reduce  the  borrower´s  
moral  hazard  by  aligning  incentives  44.  These  effects  cause  a  reduction  in  the  risk  of  
lending,  and  hence  increase  the  willingness  of  lenders  to  provide  finance.  However,  
the  provision  of  guarantees  effectively  means  that  the  business  no  longer  has  limited  
liability,  and  default  often  causes  dramatic  financial  problems  in  the  households  of  the  
individuals  involved.  Rules  need  to  be  enacted  to  coordinate  the  resultant  insolvency  
proceedings  of  the  guarantor  and  the  micro-­business  45,  as  well  as,  preferably,  out  of  
court  solutions  operating  at  a  pre-­insolvency  stage,  to  ensure  a  consistent  regime  of  
debt  discharge.      Moreover,  rules  are  needed  that  tackle  abusive  use  of  guarantees  
46.    
4.   Issues  arising  in  relation  to  the  Model  Law  and  possible  
solutions  
Generally  speaking,  the  UNCITRAL  Model  Law  creates  a  system  that  is  particularly  
good   for   the   financing  of  small  businesses:  although   it  applies   to  all  business   (and  
consumer)   finance,   it   clearly   works   particularly   well   for   non-­financial   SMEs,   and,  
because  it  enables  security  to  be  given  over  any  kind  of  asset,  as  well  as  all  the  assets  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43  Gold-­backed   loan  products  have  been  developed,   for   example,   by  Tameer  Microfinance  Bank   in  
Pakistan  and  Kshetriya  Gramin  Financial  Services  in  India  MS  presentation  slide  16  (see  fn  13)).  
44  See  A.  Katz,   “An  Economic  Analysis  of   the  Guarantee  Contract”,  The  University  of  Chicago  Law  
Review,  1999,   nbr.66,   pg.   47  et   seq.   In   line  with   this   type  of   analysis,   see  also  D.  Baird,   “Security  
Interests  Reconsidered”,  Virginia  Law  Review  1994,  nbr.  80,  pgs.  2249  et  seq.    
45  On  the  abuse  of  personal  guarantees  for  corporate  business  and  how  pre-­insolvency  (and  insolvency)  
law  may  solve  the  problem,  see  D.  Hahn,  “Velvet  Bankruptcy”,  in  Theoretical  Inquiries  in  Law,  2006,  
vol.  7,  available  at  http://www7.tau.ac.il/ojs/index.php/til/article/view/600.    
46  For  example,  the  German  Constitutional  Court  (followed  by  the  civil  law  section  of  the  Supreme  Court)  
has   rendered   the  guarantee  of  a   related  person  unenforceable,  when  such  person  has  no   relevant  
assets  or  income  (on  the  grounds  that  the  initial  guarantee  is  deemed  as  taken  abusively  with  a  view  to  
“harnessing”  the  borrower´s  behaviour).  CITE    
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of  a  business,  it  could  facilitate  the  financing  of  micro-­businesses  as  discussed  above,  
and  would   remove  many   legal  obstacles   to  such   financing.           There  are,  however,  
some  specific  areas  in  which  it  is  likely  to  work  less  well,  because  of  the  nature  of  both  
the  financing  and  the  businesses.      There  are  two  main  characteristics  of  financing  of  
micro-­businesses  which  are  likely  to  cause  problems.    One  is  that  they  are  often  do  
not   use   the   corporate   form,   and   are   likely   to   be   sole   entrepreneurs,   or   that   if   the  
corporate   form   is   used,   there   is   little   distinction   between   the   company   and   the  
individual  running  the  business.  The  other  is  that  the  amounts  lent  are  very  small,  and  
therefore,  to  make  lending  economic,  transaction  costs  needs  to  be  very  low  indeed.      
Bearing  these  two  characteristics  in  mind,  three  specific  issues  are  discussed  in  this  
section.      
a.     Notification  
There  are  a  number  of  situations  in  which  the  Model  Law  requires  a  notification  to  be  
sent  to  the  grantor.47    Apart  from  in  Art  15(2)  (which  specifies  that  the  notice  is  to  be  
sent  to  the  registered  address  of  the  grantor  unless  the  secured  creditor  knows  of  a  
more  recent  address)  the  Model  Law  does  not  specify  in  detail  to  where  the  notification  
should  be  sent.    This  is  particularly  true  of  the  out  of  court  enforcement  provisions.48        
We  suggest  that,  in  the  case  of  micro-­businesses,  clarification  and  some  mandatory  
rules  are  needed.      If  secured  creditors  are  unsure  that  notifications  given  in  relation  
to  out  of  court  enforcement  can  be  given  quickly  and  easily,  and  will  be  effective,  this  
will  affect  their  decision  to  extend  secured  credit  to  micro-­businesses  under  the  Model  
Law  system,  since  enforcement  may  be  challenged   in  court  on   the  ground  that   the  
grantor  was  not  notified.        Court  challenges  invariably  increase  delay  and  costs.                
If  the  grantor  is  a  company,  it  will  have  a  registered  office  to  which  a  notice  can  be  
sent.49      However,   particularly   in   the   case   of   micro-­businesses,   at   the   time   of  
enforcement,  quite  often  the  business  will  not  operate  from  the  registered  office,  and  
there   may   no   longer   be   individuals   associated   with   the   business   at   that   address.        
Therefore,   it   would   be   advantageous   to   clarify   that   if   a   notification   is   sent   to   the  
registered  office,   the   company  must  be  deemed   to  have   received   it.         If   electronic  
notifications   are   permitted,   which   is   likely   to   be   the   case   with   any   modern  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47  For  example,  Art  15(2)  Registry  Provisions  (secured  creditor  must  send  grantor   the  notification  of  
registration   it   receives   from   the   registry),   Art   77(2)(b)   (secured   creditor  must   give   grantor   notice   of  
default  and  of  its  intention  to  take  possession  of  the  collateral),  Art  78  (4)  (secured  creditor  must  give,  
inter  alia,  grantor  notice  of  its  intention  to  dispose  of    the  collateral),  and  Art  80(2)(a)  (secured  creditor  
must  send  to,  inter  alia,  grantor  any  proposal  to  acquire  the  collateral  itself.      Some  of  these  notifications    
must  also  be  given  to  other  people  eg  a  debtor  (such  as  a  guarantor)  if  different  from  the  grantor,  who  
might,  of  course,  also  be  a  natural  person  and  to  whom  the  argument  in  the  text  would  then  apply.  
48  Arts  77  (2)(b),  78(4)  and  80(2)(a).  
49  And  if  the  registered  office  changes,  this  change  should  appear  on  the  companies  register.  
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implementation  of   the  Model  Law,  we  suggest   that   the  scheme  proposed  below  for  
individuals  should  also  apply  to  companies.  
If  the  grantor  is  an  individual  (a  sole  entrepreneur),  his  or  her  home  address  may  well  
change  reasonably  frequently  and  the  secured  creditor  will  not  necessarily  know  about  
this.    The  same  is  true  of  an  individual’s  email  address50.    While,  in  the  context  of  larger  
transactions,   it  might  be  worth  the  parties  bargaining  ex  ante   to  set  up  a  system  to  
deal  with  notification,   this  will  be   too  costly   for   the  very   low  value   financing  we  are  
considering  here.      A  mandatory  system  is  needed,  although,  perhaps,  one  that  can  
be  modified  by  agreement  between  the  parties.    It  needs  to  be  simple,  and  effective.      
For  example,  in  relation  to  a  sole  entrepreneur  (or  a  company),  a  system  could  provide  
that  details  of  the  means  of  notification  are  captured  at  the  inception  of  the  transaction,  
either  as  part  of  the  registration  process  or  by  some  other  means.    Further,  a  duty  to  
update  these  details,  using  easy  to  use  technology,  could  be  imposed  on  the  grantor  
with   the   result   that   enforcement   consequences   flow   from   notification   having   been  
given  to  the  last  address  stored  on  the  system.51    Under  this  system,  the  grantor  has  
a   strong   incentive   to   update,   otherwise   she   will   be   deemed   to   have   received   a  
notification  even  though  it  was  not  in  fact  actually  received  by  her.      The  system  could  
also  include  a  backstop  so  that  if  the  delivery  of  the  notification  to  a  postal  or  email  
address   is   objectively   unsuccessful,   then   notification   can   be   effected   by   serving   a  
notice  publicly  in  a  publicly  accessible  institution.52      The  same  system  could  apply  to  
other   debtors   or   grantors,   such   as   guarantors,   who   are,   in   the   context   of   micro-­
businesses,  also  likely  to  be  individuals.53        The  Model  Law  rules  as  to  notification  are,  
of  course,  part  of  the  balancing  of  interests  between  the  ability  of  a  creditor  to  enforce  
effectively   (and   out   of   court)   and   the   protection   of   a   debtor:   this   balance  may   be  
different  where  the  debtor  is  an  sole  entrepreneur  or  guarantor.      Having  said  this,  if  
the   rule   is  clear,  and  updating   is  easy,   the  scheme  suggested  may  strike   the   right  
balance  between  protection  and  reduction  of  cost.      The  question  of  balance  is  more  
difficult  if  contractual  modification  of  the  mandatory  scheme  is  permitted,  since  there  
is   then   the  possibility   that  a  party  with  superior  bargaining  power  would  be  able   to  
impose  an  unbalanced  regime  on  the  weaker  party.    In  the  case  of  micro-­businesses,  
this   is   a   particular   danger   because   of   the   disparity   in   the   sizes   of   lender   and  
borrower.54    
b.    Enforcement    
There  are  two  main  issues  relating  to  enforcement  which  arise  where  a  business  is  
very  small.      In  the  case  of  a  sole  entrepreneur,  or  a  guarantor  who  is  an  individual,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50  If  electronic  notification  is  permitted  under  the  registry  regulations  enacted.  
51  Although  a  backstop  for  emergencies  would  probably  be  needed.  
52  Which  could  also  be  effected  electronically  if  circumstances  permit.  
53  See  section  3c.  
54  See  section  5.  
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there  will  need  to  be  some  limits  on  what  can  be  seized  by  the  secured  creditor.          Even  
if   a   security   interest   over   all   assets   is   given,   in   most   jurisdictions,   certain   assets,  
deemed  necessary  to  live  with  dignity,  are  protected  at  law  from  seizure  by  execution  
creditors.55    The  same  protection  is  necessary  even  where  they  have  been  given  as  
collateral.  Therefore,  enforcement  of  collateral  should  be  only  against  those  personal  
assets   which   are   not   protected   at   law.         At   present   this   is   not   enshrined   in   the  
provisions   of   the   Model   law   dealing   with   out   of   court   enforcement,56   although   if  
enforcement  takes  place  through  the  court57  or  the  insolvency  system,  the  court  may  
impose  the  protection  mentioned.      Any  implementation  of  the  Model  Law  would  have  
to  be  subject  to  these  protective  provisions  of  national  law,  and  this  needs  to  be  clear  
to   creditors   from   the   start   so   that   they   know   what   assets   will   be   available   on  
enforcement.        That  is  not  to  say  that  personal  assets  cannot  be  used  as  collateral  at  
all.      As  mentioned  above,  non-­essential  personal  assets  such  as  gold  jewellery  can  
be  effectively  used  as  collateral  for  the  financing  of  a  micro-­business.58  
In   addition,   the   out-­of-­court   remedies   provided   in   the   Model   Law   may   be   too  
complicated  and  costly  for  very  low-­value  loans.  In  relation  to  enforcement  of  security  
rights  securing  very  small  loans,  a  simplified  out-­of-­court  procedure  may  be  needed  
with  some  protection  for  the  debtor  built  in.  Moreover,  it  may  be  necessary  to  move  
towards   a   “small   claims”   court   model,   to   facilitate   enforcement   by   means   of   pre-­
designed  templates  with  limited  access  to  appeal  or  contradiction  and/or  to  consider  
the  use  of  Alternative  Dispute  Resolution  or  Online  Dispute  Resolution  as  alternatives  
to  court  procedures.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55  Such  “exempt  property”,  which   typically  only  exists   for   individuals,  comprises  non-­seizable  assets  
that   cannot   be   foreclosed   upon   on   social   protection   grounds.   Often,   the   non-­seizable   property   will  
consist  of  working  instruments,  the  bed  and  basic  home  furniture,  basic  clothing,  etc.  More  importantly,  
in  many  jurisdictions  wages  up  to  a  certain  amount  (usually  related  to  the  minimum  salary)  will  not  be  
seizable  (ie,  future  receivables  of  the  sole  entrepreneur).  But  non-­seizable  property  is  to  be  determined  
at  the  moment  of  enforcement,  not  at  the  moment  of  creation  of  the  security  right.  There  is  no  ab  initio  
exempt  property.  This  is  because  assets  are  not,  per  se,  exempt,  but  only  when  a  certain  context  of  the  
owner´s  personal  poverty  exists;;  and  it   is  at  the  enforcement  stage  when  the  existence  of  the  social  
context  is  to  be  ascertained  (so,  for  example,  a  person  may  grant  a  security  right  over  his  bed,  or  over  
his  future  wages,  and  only  if,  at  the  moment  of  enforcement,  the  bed  is  the  grantor´s  only  place  to  sleep  
or  wages  are  his  only  source  of  income  may  enforcement  be  excluded).  As  examples  of  this  type  of  
regimes,   see   Germany´s   s.   850   Zivilprozessordnung   or   arts.   605   et   seq   of   Spain´s   Ley   de  
Enjuiciamiento   Civil.   This   protection   applies   even   within   insolvency   proceedings   (see,   generally,  
UNCITRAL´s  Legislative  Guide  on  Insolvency  Law,  Part  II,  2,  A.3).          
56  Article  73(3)  of  the  Model  Law  states  that  the  exercise  of  a  secured  creditor’s  out  of  court  
enforcement  rights  is  determined  by  the  provisions  of  the  Chapter  of  the  Model  Law  on  enforcement  
(ch  VII),  ie  not,  without  more,  subject  to  the  rules  of  the  enacting  State  on  the  protection  of  individuals  
as  discussed  in  the  text.  
57  Art  73(2)  
58  See  3b  above.    
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c.  Security  over  a  bank  account  for  a  third  party  lender  
A  very  small  business  is  unlikely  to  have  a  bank  account,  but  a  lender  might  well  insist  
on  this  in  order  to  make  sure  that  the  money  the  business  receives  does  not  just  get  
spent  or  lost  without  the  secured  party  having  some  control  over  it.        While  the  Model  
Law  enables  a  creditor  to  obtain  a  security  right   in  a  bank  account  relatively  easily,  
there  are  some  aspects  which  are  complicated  and  which  would,  at   the  very   least,  
need  to  be  carefully  explained  to  both  lender  and  borrower  in  the  context  of  financing  
a  micro-­business.         In   relation   to   the  money   in   the  account,   the   lender  would  want  
priority  over  the  bank  with  whom  the  account  is  held.    Under  the  Model  Law,  there  is  
only  one  way  to  do  this:  the  account  must  be  in  the  name  of  the  lender:59  this  may  not  
be  obvious  to  someone  unfamiliar  with  this  system.      Secondly,  there  needs  to  be  a  
balance  between  the  need  of  the  micro-­business  to  use  some  of  the  cash  to  run  its  
business  and  the  desire  of  the  secured  creditor  to  make  sure  some  of  it  is  there  if  there  
is  a  default.    The  Model  Law  has  two  relevant  provisions.      The  grantor’s  ability  to  run  
its  business  is  aided  by  art  47(6)  which  protects  recipients  of  payments  who  do  not  
have  knowledge  of  any  breach  of  the  security  agreement.      The  secured  creditor   is  
permitted   to  withdraw   from   the  bank  account  at  any   time   if   the  grantor  consents,60  
which  could  enable  it  to  keep  the  funds  in  the  account  low  and  force  the  grantor  to  ask  
permission   to   borrow  more  money  when   it  wants   to  make  payments.         These   two  
provisions  do  not  really  amount  to  guidance  as  to  the  best  agreement  for  parties  to  the  
financing  of  a  micro-­business  to  enter  into,  especially  not  as  to  where  the  balance  is  
struck.         Firmer   guidance   would   be   necessary   for   those   involved   in   low   value  
transactions,  where  individual  bargaining  is  neither  possible  nor  cost-­effective.  
d.     Guarantees  and  the  Model  Law    
The  UNCITRAL  Model   Law  does  not   expressly   cover   guarantees,   and   there   is   no  
guidance  in  the  legislative  guide  on  the  interrelation  between  the  law  of  guarantees  
and   the   law   of   secured   transactions.         There   are   certain   very   specific   points   of  
interaction  which  ought  to  be  addressed.    First,  guarantors  frequently  give  security  for  
their  obligations  under  the  guarantee.61      Thus,  the  points  made  in  subsections  4a,  4b  
and  4c  also  apply  to  guarantors  as  security  providers.        Further,  guarantors  who  are  
not  paid  for  the  giving  of  the  guarantee,  and  who  are  not  in  a  position  to  bargain  for  
their  own  protection,  require  protection  from  the  general   law62.        One  aspect  of   this  
protection  is  typically  that  a  guarantor  who  pays  off  the  secured  debt  is  subrogated  to  
the  secured  creditor’s  rights  in  relation  to  the  collateral,  including  the  right  to  enforce.        
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59  Art  47(2)  and  (5)  (which  gives  protection  against  the  bank’s  right  of  set-­off).      A  control  agreement  
under  art  47(4)  is  too  complicated  for  this  level  of  financing,  and,  in  any  event,  does  not  give  priority  
over  the  bank.  
60  Art  82(2)  
61  This  is  reflected  in  the  definition  of  ‘debtor’  and  ‘grantor’  in  the  Model  Law  art  2.  
62  See,  also,  the  reflections  in  section  2  (d)  above.    
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However,   the  complicated  enforcement  procedures  under   the  Model  Law,63  are  not  
suitable  for  use  by  individual  guarantors,  who  could  find  themselves  subject  to  liability  
to   other   parties   for   not   having   followed   the   correct   procedures.         To   bolster   the  
protection  from  this  right  of  subrogation,  a  secured  creditor  should  owe  an  obligation  
to  a  guarantor  to  preserve  the  collateral  and  its  rights  over  it.    Thus,  for  example,  a  
secured  creditor  should  be  under  an  obligation   to  perfect   its  security   right  so  as   to  
preserve   the   priority   of   that   right   for   the   benefit   of   a   guarantor,   and   should   file   an  
amendment   notice   identifying   the   guarantor   as   the   secured   creditor   if   the   right   of  
subrogation  arises.64      While  these  obligations  may  arise  as  a  matter  of  the  general  
law  of  guarantees,  their  content  is  strongly  influenced  by  the  detailed  provisions  of  the  
Model  Law.      Individual  guarantors  of  the  debts  of  microbusinesses  not  only  need  to  
know  and  understand  the  obligations  owed  to  them,  there  also  needs  to  be  an  effective  
way  of  enforcing  breach  to  incentivise  compliance.  
5.  Other  issues  affecting  access  to  finance  for  micro-­
businesses  
In  the  previous  sections  we  have  reviewed  some  of  the  specific  issues  that  may  arise  
concerning  micro-­businesses  from  the  implementation  of  a  Model  Law-­type  system.  
But  the  Model  Law,  as  a  stand-­alone  piece  of  legislation,  is  not  sufficient  to  create  a  
legal  framework  where  micro-­businesses  may  access  enough  credit  under  adequate  
conditions.  Other  branches  of  the  law  need  to  be  adapted  to  generate  a  suitable  and  
enabling  legal  environment  for  micro-­businesses.  Debtors  of  a  very  small  size,  of  low  
sophistication  and  with  poor   financial   information,   together  with  modest  amounts  of  
credit  requested  comprise  a  cocktail  that  is  hard  for  most  participants  in  the  financing  
market  to  digest.  Legislative  action  is  necessary  to  generate  the  correct  incentives  for  
the   relevant   stakeholders   in   order   to   bridge   the  gap  between   financing  needs  and  
credit  availability.  
Micro-­businesses   often   borrow   from   financial   institutions   or   larger   commercial  
creditors.   The  difference   in   size   results   in   unequal   bargaining   power.   Lenders   find  
themselves  in  a  position  where  they  can  unilaterally  define  the  terms  of  the  transaction  
which,  in  the  best  of  cases,  leads  to  the  debtor  having  to  choose  between  the  best  of  
two  evils,  and,  in  the  worst  case  (when  no  alternative  is  available),  the  debtor  has  no  
choice  at  all.  Frequently  the  interest  rates  are  too  high,  especially  in  cases  of  default.  
Contractual   terms   that   only   benefit   the   lender   are   also   commonplace:   possible  
examples   are   abusive   enforcement   clauses,   biased   definitions   of   what   constitutes  
default   or   the   imposition   of   unreasonable   jurisdiction   clauses   (that   is,   where   the  
jurisdiction  is  not  linked  to  the  place  of  the  transaction  in  any  way).      Another  classic  
reflection  of  the  inequality  in  bargaining  power  is  the  request  by  the  lender  for  personal  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63  See  sections  4(a)  and  4(b)  above  
64  See  art  16  Model  Registry  Provisions  and  para  189  Guide  to  Enactment.  
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guarantees  by  related  persons,  when  the  latter  have  no  or  few  assets  (and  the  lender  
is  aware  of  this).  Legislators  must  tackle  these  issues  by  making  the  playing  field  more  
level   and   avoiding   abusive   behaviour   (for   example,   by   controlling   certain   clauses,  
limiting  default  interest  rates  or  monitoring  creditor  behaviour  by  regulation).  
The  financial  lender´s  behaviour  towards  risk  raises  regulatory  issues.  Again  because  
of  the  small  size  of  the  loan  and  the  debtor,  financial  institutions  do  not  always  conduct  
proper   risk   assessment   analysis.   At   the   origination   of   credit,   the   viability   of   the  
business   is   either   not   properly   considered   or   is   directly   ignored.   These   features  
become  more  marked   the  more  underdeveloped   the   relevant  economy.65  Banks   in  
such   situations,   often   with   the   consent   and   even   active   cooperation   of   their  
supervisors,   will   only   lend   against   collateral,   irrespective   of   the   potential   of   the  
business.   This   constitutes   “bad   banking”   and   is   particularly   serious   where   micro-­
businesses  have  little  or  no  collateral  to  give.  Moreover,  the  inequality  of  bargaining  
power,  again,  often  with  the  cooperation  of  financial  supervisors,  leads  to  the  frequent  
overcollateralization  of   loans.   In   developing   jurisdictions,   it   is   not   infrequent   to   find  
loan-­to-­value  ratios  of  200%  and  above.  Naturally,  this  undermines  credit  and  hampers  
the  chances  of  micro-­businesses   to  access  credit  and   to,   therefore,   thrive.  Another  
area  where  legislators  have  to  take  decisions  concerns  the  passivity  of  banks  after  the  
origination  of  credit.  The  risk  of  the  loan  is  poorly  monitored  after  origination  (if  at  all),  
and  few  banks  are  prepare  to  engage  in  proper  restructuring  negotiations  when  default  
is  approaching:  either  an  automatic  rescheduling  takes  place  (with  the  inherent  risk  of  
“evergreening”)  or  the  creditor  merely  waits  for  default  to  occur  and  forecloses  on  the  
collateral.  The  consequences  of  the  latter  is  the  destruction  of  viable  businesses,  in  
the  latter  case,  and,  of  the  former,  mistrust  in  the  reality  of  the  balance  sheet  of  banks.      
6.  Conclusion  
This  paper  has  drawn  on  the  very  significant  impact  of  microbusinesses  on  the  world  
economy  to  show  the  importance  of  access  to  finance  to  the  health  and  growth  of  such  
businesses.    There  are  a  number  of  factors  which  inhibit  financing  to  these  businesses,  
such  as  the  lack  of  adequate  records  and  information  to  enable  due  diligence  to  take  
place,   the   small   size   of   the   loans   required,   which   makes   the   transaction   costs  
proportionately   more   expensive   than   in   larger   loans,   and   the   fact   that   micro-­
businesses  tend  not  to  have  available  the  types  of  collateral  traditionally  favoured  by  
financial  institutions.        The  legal  system  of  secured  financing  introduced  by  the  Model  
Law  can  help  address  many  of  these  points,  since  security  can  be  taken  over  all  types  
of   collateral,   the   registration   system   aids   certainty   and   reduces   costs,   and   the  
availability   of   quick   and   cheap  enforcement,   including   out   of   court   enforcement,   is  
likely   to  encourage   lenders   to  accept  different   types  of  collateral,  and   to   lend  more  
cheaply.            
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65    Both  in  respect  of  the  banking  sector  and  the  non-­financial  economy,  
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Certain  features  of   lending  to  microbusinesses,  however,  require  special   treatment,  
both   from   the  general   legal   and   regulatory   environment,   and   from   the  Model   Law,  
which   is  primarily   targeted  at   lending  to  small  and  medium  sized  enterprises  rather  
than   tiny  microbusinesses.            Although   some  microbusinesses   are   structured   in   a  
corporate   form,   in   reality   it   is   individuals   which   are   exposed   to   unlimited   liability,  
whether   as   sole   traders,   as   director   or   shareholder   guarantors   of   the   corporate  
liabilities,   or   as   family   or   friends   of   the   entrepreneur  who  act   as   guarantors   of   the  
liabilities   of   the   business.         While   some   risk-­taking   is   to   be   encouraged,   these  
individuals  also  need  some  protection  from  the  law.      For  example,  not  all  personal  
assets  should  be  able  to  be  the  subject  of  enforcement  of  collateral,  and  freedom  of  
contract  may  need  to  be  tempered  due  to  the  vast  inequalities  in  bargaining  power.        
Moreover,  some  of  the  Model  Law  processes  do  not  apply  easily  to  individuals,  such  
as   the   requirements   of   notification   and   the   somewhat   complicated   processes   of  
enforcement  and  the  taking  of  security  over  bank  accounts.      Further,  the  very  small  
size  of  the  loans  means  that  even  the  relatively  cheap  procedures  of  the  Model  Law  
may  be  too  expensive  or  complex  for  this  market,  and  also  that  financial  institutions  
may  rely  too  heavily  on  collateral,  and  not  assess  the  risks  of  lending  and  the  viability  
of  the  business  properly.        
Having   identified   these  and  other  relevant   issues,   this  paper  makes  some  tentative  
recommendations  as  to  how  they  can  be  overcome,  by  some  microbusiness  specific  
amendments  to  the  Model  Law,  by  some  further  guidance  as  to  the  operation  of  the  
Model  Law  in  this  area  and  as  to  regulatory  and  other  legal  developments  which  could  
ameliorate  some  of  the  wider  problems.      
